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Introduction
This paper develops a version of Pontryagin's maximum principle for problems of optimal control in which a control variable is required to satisfy a monotonicity constraint. Such control problems arise naturally in the analysis of incentive problems with hidden characteristics and a continuum of types. Under a standard single-crossing condition on preferences, in such I am grateful to Mark Hahmeier for very helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. 1 problems, incentive compatibility requires that outcomes depend monotonically on the hidden characteristic.
The usual approach to handling monotonicity constraints on control variables is to recast the variable in question as a state variable, to assume that the function relating this state variable to the hidden characteristic is piecewise continuously di¤erentiable, to treat its slope as a new control variable and to require that this new control variable be nonnegative. This procedure has been pioneered by Guesnerie and La¤ont (1983) . Subsequent treatments and applications can be found in Ebert (1991) , Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) , Brunner (1993) , and .
Given that the control variable is endogenous, the requirement that this variable be piecewise smooth in the underlying parameter is problematic. The implications of this requirement for the exogenous data of the problem are often unclear. When they are clear, they may be unpalatable.
The paper shows that this additional condition is not actually needed. The usual set of necessary conditions for optimal control problems, including a version of the maximum principle, are obtained without any additional assumptions. If the control variables happen to be absolutely continuous anyway, the conditions given here coincide with those of Guesnerie and La¤ont. However, they also apply if the control variables are not continuous.
The basic idea is to exploit the monotonicity property itself. Being monotonic, the control variable in question can be treated as the sum of an absolutely continuous component and a singular component, both of which must be monotonic. The analysis of Guesnerie and La¤ont can be applied to the absolutely continuous component. This yields the usual characterization of solutions in terms of costate variables and a maximum principle for the slope of the absolutely continuous part. Given this characterization, one can use the consideration that, at the optimum, a proportional decrease of the singular component of the control variable in question should not raise the value of the objective function, to show that the maximum principle also applies to the "slope" of the singular component.
The …rst part of the argument is based on Clarke's (1976 Clarke's ( , 1983 version of the maximum principle under minimal hypotheses. In this version, there is no need for continuity in the dependence of the various functions on the underlying parameter. Whereas traditional statements of the maximum principle assume that, e.g., the integrand in the objective function be continuous in the variable of integration, Clarke only requires measurability.
The second part of the argument involves just calculus. However, if the control problem involves explicit constraints for both endpoints, an additional Regularity Condition is needed to deal with the possibility that the variation under consideration, i.e. a proportional decrease of the singular component of the control variable in question, when taken by itself, leads to a violation of an endpoint constraint.
In the following, Section 2 formulates the control problem with explicit constraints for one endpoint only. A simple contracting problem with a hidden characteristic is used to illustrate the problem and to indicate why the assumption of absolute continuity of the control variable is problematic. Section 3 presents the main theorem, i.e., the maximum principle for the control problem with explicit constraints for one endpoint. The theorem is proved in Section 4. Section 5 extends the analysis to control problems with explicit constraints for both endpoints. Here, the optimal income tax problem of Mirrlees (1971) provides the leading example. Supplementary proofs are given in the Appendix.
The Control Problem with Explicit Constraints
for One Endpoint Only In this speci…cation, f is a function from R` R m R n [0; 1] into R; G 0 is a function from R`into R k , where k `; h is a function from R` R m R n [0; 1] into R`; and G 0 is a vector in R k :
The functions f and h are assumed to be bounded, as well as measurable with respect to the product B(R` R m R n ) L of the Borel -algebra on R` R m R n and the Lebesgue -algebra on the unit interval. In addition, for any t 2 [0; 1]; the sections f (:; :; :; t) and h(:; :; :; t) of f and h that are determined by t are assumed to be equi-Lipschitz-continuous and continuously di¤erentiable. The function G 0 is also continuously di¤erentiable; its Jacobian has rank k everywhere.
Optimization problems of this type occur regularly in models of incentive provision with hidden characteristics. As an example, consider a principal who does not know the productivity of the agent to whom he proposes a contract. Given his ignorance, he o¤ers a menu of contracts, letting the agent choose whichever contract he likes best. The menu of contracts is represented by a pair of functions that indicate for each t the output y(t) 0 that the agent is supposed to produce and the wage w(t) that the agent will receive if his productivity parameter has the value t: The principal's problem is to choose the functions y( ) and w( ) so as to maximize the expected value of his pro…t y(t) w(t) subject to incentive compatibility and individualrationality conditions. In analysing this problem, it is convenient to write
where v( ) is a function that indicates, for each t; the payo¤ v(t) that the agent receives from contracting with the principal if his productivity parameter is t and c(v(t); y(t); t); the consumption level that permits a person of type t to obtain the payo¤ level v(t) when this person is required to produce the output y(t) is implicitly de…ned by the equation v(t) = u(c(v(t); y(t); t); y(t); t):
If the utility function u satis…es a single-crossing condition, then, by a well known result of Mirrlees (1976) , incentive compatibility is equivalent to the requirement that If the desired function y( ) were known to be absolutely continuous, 1 the problem of maximizing (2.1) under the constraints (2.2) -(2.6) could be formulated as a standard control problem with state variables x(t); y(t) and control variables z(t); q(t) where q( ) is the (Radon-Nikodym) derivative of y( ): In this formulation, the monotonicity condition would reduce to the requirement that q(t) 0 for almost all t:
However, the presumption that y( ) is absolutely continuous is unattractive. The implications of this presumption for the exogenous data of the problem are unclear. Even when they are clear, they may be unduly restrictive.
To see the issue, consider the contracting example again. If it wasn't for the monotonicity constraint on y( ), this would be a control problem with state variable v(t) and control variable y(t). For any t; the control choice y = y(t) should be a global maximizer of the Hamiltonian expression H(v(t); y; t; ') = (y c(v(t); y; t)) (t) + 'u t (c(v(t); y; t); y; t): (2.14)
By the maximum theorem, the global maximizers ofĤ(v(t); ; t; ') are continuous in t ifĤ(v(t); y; t; ') is jointly continuous in t and y; and if, for each t; the global maximizer ofĤ(v(t); ; t; ') is unique. If these conditions are not satis…ed, continuity cannot be taken for granted. Both conditions are restrictive. Continuity ofĤ(v(t); y; t; ') in t and y requires that the density (t) in (2.14) be continuous in t: If we actually think of as a probability density, this requirement is unproblematic. It can, however, be problematic if is itself derived from other data of the problem. Thus, in Hellwig (2008) , I study the principal-agent problem with hidden characteristics without requiring the distribution of the productivity parameter to have a continuous density, i.e., I allow this distribution to have mass points as well as a continuous part. To make the problem amenable to control-theoretic methods, the notion of an agent's "type" t; i.e., his productivity parameter, is replaced by the notion of a "pseudo-type" x; with associated "type" t = (x); the idea being that a type t is a mass point of the type distribution if many pseudo-types have the same type t:
The distribution G of pseudo-types has a density ; so that, by replacing types with pseudo-types, one can formulate the principal's problem as an instance of the control problem considered here. However, if the original type distribution has mass points, the density of the distribution of "pseudotypes" is not continuous. 2 Further, in the absence of additional assumptions about the utility function, there is no presumption that, for any t; the functionĤ(v(t); ; t; '(t)) should be quasiconcave. Quasiconcavity of u( ; ; t) implies that c(v(t); ; t) is a convex function and, therefore, that the …rst term on the right-hand side of (2.14) is concave in y. However, quasiconcavity of u( ; ; t) is not su¢ cient to determine the curvatures of the function y ! u t (c(v(t); y; t); y; t) and of the second term on the right-hand side of (2.14). 3 The Hamiltonian expression (2.14) may therefore have multiple maxima. In consequence, it may be 2 Let F be the distribution of productivity parameters t. If (x) is the productivity parameter of an agent with pseudo-type x; the value (x) of the density of the pseudo-type distribution satis…es
if, at t = (x), the derivative F 0 (t) of the distribution function F ( ) is well de…ned, and (x) = 1 otherwise. For details, see Hellwig (2006) . 3 The costate variable ' can be shown to be nonpositive. Therefore, if u is concave in c and y; quasiconcavity ofĤ in y is assured if the function y ! ut(c(v(t); y; t); y; t) is convex. This is equivalent to the condition that u exhibit the property consumptionspeci…c risk aversion be a nonincreasing function of t, i.e., that for each two-dimensional outcome lottery, the amount of consumption that the agent is willing to give up in order to have the lottery replaced by the vector of expected values, be a nonincreasing function of t: For details, see Hellwig (2007 b) , with references to Mirrlees (1986) and Hellwig (2004) . 6 impossible for a global maximizer ofĤ(v(t); ; t; '(t)) to depend continuously on t:
A diagrammatic illustration is given in Figures 1 and 2 . The curves A-A in these …gures indicate the values of y which correspond to critical points of the Hamiltonian for di¤erent t: The fat segments of these curves correspond to global maxima. As the …gures are drawn, the global maximizers are necessarily discontinuous at somet where the Hamiltonian has multiple maxima.
In Figure 1 , the global maximizers are actually nondecreasing so that the monotonicity constraint is nonbinding. In Figure 2 , by contrast, the global maximizers of the Hamiltonian violate monotonicity. The correct, nondecreasing, solution to the principal's problem therefore involves a ‡at segment that is given by an ironing procedure as in Guesnerie and La¤ont (1983) .
However, in Figure 2 , there is an interdependence between the ironing procedure and the discontinuity in the optimal y( ): The initial point t of the ironing interval is a discontinuity point of y( ): By contrast to Guesnerie and La¤ont (1983) , therefore, the value of y( ) on the ironing interval is not a maximizer of the Hamiltonian at the interval endpoint t: In consequence, t, i.e., the discontinuity point of the correct, nondecreasing solution to the principal's problem, is not the same ast, the dicontinuity point of the global maximizers ofĤ(v(t); ; t; '(t)):
In the following, I study the problem of maximizing (2.1) under the constraints (2.2) -(2.6) without requiring that y( ) is absolutely continuous: It turns out that the very monotonicity condition (2.6) provides additional structure which can be used to obtain a version of the maximum principle for this problem. The resulting characterization of solutions to the maximization problem turns out to be similar to the one given by Guesnerie and La¤ont (1983) ; however, this characterization encompasses discontinuity points of y( ):
The Main Theorem
Assuming that y( ) is absolutely continuous, Guesnerie and La¤ont (1983) work with the Hamiltonian H(x; y; z; q; t; '; ) = f (x; y; z; t) + ' h(x; y; z; t) + q;
where q corresponds to the derivative of y( ); and is the associated vector of costate variables. The monotonicity constraint on y( ) translates into a nonnegativity constraint on the control vector q: The maximum principle requires that, for almost every t; the chosen controls z(t) and q(t) should maximize the value of the Hamiltonian at t: The necessary and su¢ cient condition for maximization with respect to q 0 is
If y( ) is not absolutely continuous, there is no presumption that, for any given t; the derivative of y( ) at t is well de…ned. Even so, for any i; one can talk heuristically about the "slope" q i (t) of y i ( ) at t if one allows for the possibility that q takes values in the extended nonnegative real numbers, R + [ f1g; with the proviso that, for any t;
With the convention that, for any i; i 1 = 0 if i = 0; i 1 = 1 if i > 0; and i 1 = 1 if i < 0; one can extend the speci…cation of the Hamiltonian (3.1) to allow for the possibility that q i = 1 for some i; in this extended speci…cation, the Hamiltonian itself takes values in the extended real numbers.
Given these modi…cations, it still makes sense to talk about z(t) and q(t) maximizing the value of the Hamiltonian at t: Indeed, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for q 0 to be maximizing H is the same as before. As in (3.1), one must have i 0 for all i and i = 0 if q i > 0; in particular, one must have
The following theorem shows that, with this extended notion of the "slope" of the nondecreasing function y( ); the Guesnerie-La¤ont characterization of solutions to the control problem in terms of a maximum principle for the choice of the "slope" of y( ) remains valid even if y( ) is not absolutely continuous. To avoid the imprecision of language involved in talking about the "slope" of a function that cannot be characterized in terms of derivatives, the key condition (f) in the theorem does not actually refer to the "slope" of y( ). However, heuristically, this condition can be interpreted as a version of the maximum principle for this "slope". 
and '(1) = 0:
and (1) = 0:
(e) For almost every t;
H(x (t); y (t); z; q (t); t; '(t); (t)): H(x (t); y (t); z (t); q; t; '(t); (t)):
This is just the maximum principle for the choice of q (t): Thus, if y ( ) is absolutely continuous, Theorem 3.1 can be read as a version of the maximum principle in the formulation of Clarke (1976 Clarke ( , 1983 , which does without most of the regularity conditions in the more traditional formulations of the principle.
However, Theorem 3.1 is more general than that. It does not actually presume that y ( ) is absolutely continuous. In the general case, statement (f) stipulates that i (t) = 0 for almost every t at which y i ( ) is strictly increasing. In particular, i (t) = 0 if q i (t); the (Radon-Nikodym) derivative of the absolutely continuous component of y i ( ) is strictly positive. In addition, i (t) = 0 if y i ( ) is discontinuous at t. As discussed above, this requirement can also be interpreted as an instance of a maximum principle for the "slope" of y i ( ):
In Hellwig (2008), Theorem 3.1 provides the basis for a uni…ed analysis of the contracting problem with unidimensional hidden characteristics, without any special assumptions about the distribution of the hidden characteristic and without any regularity assumption about the dependence of outcomes on types. In addition to the familiar properties of no distortion at the top and downward distortions below the top of the type distribution, the analysis actually shows that any mass point of the type distribution "below the top" must be bunched with immediately adjacent higher types. Moreover, unless the mass point is also bunched with lower types, the optimal incentive scheme is likely to be discontinuous in the transition from immediately adjacent lower types to the mass point. 5 The discontinuity is due to the fact that, in (2.13), the density (t) is not continuous in t if this density is merely a mathematical artefact that is introduced to make the incentive problem with an arbitrary type distribution amenable to control-theoretic methods.
Proof of the Theorem
Before turning to the proof of the theorem, I give two general results about the solutions to the constraint (2.3). Detailed proofs of these results are given in the Appendix. They are based on routine arguments from the theory of ordinary di¤erential equations, 6 adapted so as to take account of the fact that h need not be continuous in the variable of integration.
I begin with a statement concerning existence and uniqueness of solutions. The constraint (2.3) is equivalent to the integral equation
holding for all t:
Lemma 4.1 For any x(0); y( ); z( ), there is a unique function x( jx(0); y( ); z( )) that satis…es (4.1) for almost all t: The function x( jx(0); y( ); z( )) is continuous.
The following result concerns the di¤erentiability properties of the relation between the exogenous data and the solution of the integral equation. Rather than studying this function as such, I …x a point (x(0); y( ); z( )) and consider the function .2) i.e., I study how a change in the initial state and in the time paths of the control variables a¤ect the solution to (4.1). In this analysis, the image 
With this speci…cation of a norm, one obtains: Lemma 4.2 For any (x(0); y( ); z( )) and any t; the function (4.2) is Fréchet di¤ erentiable. At = ( x; y( ); z( )); the Fréchet di¤ erential of this function with increment = ( x; y( ); z( )) is given by the solution to the linear integral equation
where h x ; h y ; h z are evaluated at (x ( ); y( ) + y( ); z( ) + z( )):
I now turn to the proof of Theorem 3.1. Being nondecreasing, the function y ( ) has a Lebesgue decomposition
into a nondecreasing absolutely continuous function y a ( ) and a nondecreasing singular 8 function y s ( ): Without loss of generality, one may assume that y s (0) = 0: The absolutely continuous function y a ( ) has a Radon-Nikodym derivative q ( ): Monotonicity of y a ( ) implies that q (t) 0 for all t:
Lemma 4.3 For given y s ( ); the functions x ( ); y a ( ); z ( ); q ( ) maximize the integral
subject to the constraints that x( ) and y a ( ) be absolutely continuous and z( ) and q( ) be measurable, that
and that, for almost all t 2 [0; 1];
and, …nally, q(t) 0:
Proof. Because the functions x ( ); y ( ); and z ( ) satisfy the constraints (2.2) -(2.6), for given y s ( ); the functions x ( ); y a ( ); z ( ), and q ( ) also satisfy the constraints (4.6) -(4.11). Further, if any functions x( ); y a ( ); z( ); and q( ) satisfy the constraints (4.6) -(4.11), then the functions x( ) = x( ); y( ) = y s ( ) + y a ( ); and z( ); satisfy the constraints (2.2) -(2.6) of the original maximization problem. Because x ( ); y ( ); and z ( ) maximize (2.1) under the constraints (2.2) -(2.6), it follows that, for any x( ); y a ( ); z( ); and q( ) which satisfy (4.6) -(4.11), one has
f (x(t); y s (t) + y a (t); z(t); t)dt
The lemma follows immediately. 
and '(1) = 0: (4.14)
(c) For almost all t 2 [0; 1]; [ f (x (t); y (t); z; t) + '(t) h(x (t); y (t); z; t)
Proof. If one writeŝ f (x(t); y a ; z; t) := f (x; y s (t) + y a ; z; t); 9 it follows that there exist ; '; ; ; ; as speci…ed in the lemma, that satisfy statements (a), (c), (e), and (f), as well as the following:
The pair ('(0); (0)) belongs to the Clarke normal cone at (x (0); y a (0)) to the set of (x; y a ) satisfying G 0 (x) G 0 and y a y s (0): By the Corollary to Theorem 2.4.5, p 54, and Corollary 2 to Theorem 2.4.7, p. 56 f., in Clarke (1983) , it follows that '(0) and (0) satisfy (4.13) and (4.16). Moreover, in the absence of any explicit constraints 10 on the the pair (x(1); y a (1)); the pair ( '(1);
(1)) belongs to the Clarke normal cone at (x (1); y a (1)) to the set R: This yields (4.14) and (4.17). Proof. If the multiplier in Lemma 4.4 were equal to zero, equations (4.12) and (4.15) would take the form ' 0 (t) = '(t) h x (x (t); y (t); z (t); t) (4.23) 9 In applying Clarke's theorem, due allowance must be made for the fact that he deals with a minimization, rather than a maximization problem. Also, the function that I use is the negative of Clarke's :
1 0 The constraint ya(1) y s (1) is automatically satis…ed if ya(0) y s (0); q(t) 0 for all t; and y s (1) y s (0): 15 and 0 (t) = '(t) h y (x (t); y (t); z (t); t):
(4.24)
The validity of (4.23) and (4.24) for almost all t is equivalent to the integral equations
and (t) = (1) [ f (x (t); y (t); z; t) + '(t)h(x (t); y (t); z; t)] (4.28) and (t) 0 and (t) q (t) = 0: (4.29)
Statement (e) of the lemma thus implies statement (e) and the …rst part of statement (f) of the theorem. Statement (e) of the lemma also implies that the second part of statement (f) of the theorem holds for almost every t at which the slope q i of the absolutely continuous part of y i is strictly positive. Indeed, upon integrating the equation in (4.29), one obtains
which shows that, for any i and almost every t, i (t) = 0 if t is a point of increase of the absolutely continuous part y ai (t) of y i (t):
To complete the proof of Theorem 3.1, it remains to be shown that (4.30) continues to hold if y a is replaced by y itself. This is the point of the following lemma. for all t: If 1; the function y( j ; y) is nonnegative-valued and nondecreasing. For such , therefore, the triple (x( j ; y); y( j ; y); z ( )) satis…es the constraints (2.2) -(2.6) of the original maximization problem. Because (x ( ); y ( ); z ( )) = (x( j0; y); y( j0; y); z ( )) is a solution to this problem, it follows that
f (x(tj0; y); y(tj0; y); z (t); t)dt
f (x(tj ; y); y(tj ; y); z (t); t)dt:
(4.38) for all 1: Because the functions (x; y; z) ! f (x; y; z; t) and ! (x(tj ; y); y(j ; y)) are continuously di¤erentiable, the function ! f (x(tj ; y); y(j ; y); z (t); t)
is also continuously di¤erentiable, with derivative @ @ f (x(tj ; y); y(j ; y); z (t); t) = f x @x(tj ; y) @ + f y @y(tj ; y) @ :
Because the functions (x; y; z) ! f (x; y; z; t); t 2 [0; 1]; are equi-Lipschitzian, because the solution to the integral equation (4.36) is a Fréchet derivative of the function ! x( j ; y), and because the function y s ( j y) belongs to L m 1 ; condition (4.38) in fact yields the …rst-order condition
at = 0; where, for each t; f x and f y are evaluated at the point (x (t); y (t); z (t); t): From (4.12), (4.15), and the fact that = 1, it follows that
(4.40) where for each t; h x and h y are also evaluated at (x (t); y (t); z (t); t):
By (4.36), one also has
(4.41) The right-hand side of (4.41) can be integrated by parts. Because (4.14) yields '(1) = 0, it follows that
(4.42) Equation (4.40) therefore implies The proof of Theorem 3.1 is now complete.
Control Problems with Integral Constraints or Explicit Constraints on Both Endpoints
None of the constraints (2.2) -(2.6) is of the form Z 1 0 g(x(t); y(t); t)dt 0:
However, such constraints occur frequently in economic applications. As an example, consider the optimal income tax problem of Mirrlees (1971) . This problem involves the same utility speci…cation and the same incentive compatibility conditions as the agency problem in Section 2. However, the indirect utility function v( ) and output requirement function y( ) are chosen to maximize the welfare objective 
(v(t); y(t); t) is implicitly de…ned by the equation v(t) = u(c(v(t); y(t); t); y(t); t):
Integral constraints of the form (5.1) can in principle be handled by introducing additional state variables. Thus, condition (5.1) is equivalent to the requirement that the additional state variable that is de…ned by the requirements that (0) = 0 (5.4) and that 0 (t) = g(x(t); y(t); t) (5.5) for all t should also satisfy the endpoint condition The additional endpoint condition raises the possibility that, in a neighbourhood of the optimal (x ( ); y ( ); z ( )); the constraint set might be degenerate, in which case the multiplier in Lemma 4.4 might be equal to zero. The additional endpoint condition also raises the possibility that the variation y( j ; y) of the control y ( ) that is considered in the proof of Lemma 4.6 might not be feasible because, for given x (0) and z ( ); the resulting x(1j ; y) violates the endpoint condition for t = 1: To avoid these di¢ culties, one needs an additional assumption about the data of the problem.
Regularity Condition
The state variable can be written in the form x(t) = ( (t); (t)) so that 20 (i) the endpoint conditions take the form .8) i.e., they are independent of (0) and (1); the functions G 0 and G 1 are continuously di¤erentiable functions, with Jacobians that have maximal rank;
(ii) moreover, for any x(0) = ( (0); (0)); y( ); z( ); there exists such that, at the point = 0; the derivative of the function
is strictly positive; i.e., a suitable change in (0); leaving (0); y( ); and z( ) unchanged, is su¢ cient to move the component (1) of the state
at t = 1 in such a way that the left-hand side of the endpoint condition is increased.
In the absence of participation constraints, the optimal income tax problem satis…es the Regularity Condition with = v and
for all t: When there are no participation constraints, the state variable v is not subject to any endpoint constraints. Moreover, under the incentive compatibility condition (2.9), a reduction in v(0); keeping y( ) unchanged, induces a decrease in c(v(t); y(t); t)) for all t and thereby an increase in the surplus R 1 0 (y(t) c(v(t); y(t); t)) (t)dt: Even so, the Regularity Condition is quite restrictive. It should, however, be regarded as a prototype, rather than the most general condition that is available. Its simplicity facilitates the presentation of the argument. This makes it easy to see what aspects of the condition matter and what scope there would be extending the analysis. I will return to this issue at the end of the paper. (1)) and 1 G 1 ( (1) 
If the vectors (t); t 2 [0; 1]; are chosen to satisfy the integral equation
for some x = ( ; ) 2 R`; then it follows that '(t) (t) is independent of t; and one has '(1) (1) = '(0) (0):
By (5.14) and (5.10), it follows that Proof. Consider the function
where is the vector provided by the Regularity Condition. For any ; the triplex( j ); y ( ); z ( ) satis…es the constraints (5.7), (5.8), and (2.3) -(2.6). By the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 4.6, one must therefore have
By the analogues of (4.12) in Lemma 4.4 and Lemma 4.5, it follows that
The derivative @x(tj ) @ satis…es the integral equation
By the same procedure as in the proof of Lemma 4.6, one can therefore compute the integral on the left-hand side of (5.25). This yields the equation
Trivially, the last term vanishes. By (5.10), the second term also vanishes, and the …rst term is equal to '(1)
By (5.12), therefore, (5.28) implies To neutralize any e¤ects that this may have on the endpoint condition (5.8), I will add a suitable scalar multiple " of the vector ( ; 0) to the initial state x (0): The path of the state variable is then given as
The function ( ; ") ! x( j ; "; y) = ( ( j ; "; y); ( j ; "; y)) is continuously di¤erentiable. If one sets " = c ; then, at = 0; the derivative of the function ! G 1 ( (1j ; c ; y) )
The Regularity Condition implies that G 0 1 ( (1)) @ (1j ;"; y) @" (0; 0) 0: By choosing c large enough, one can ensure that the derivative (5.32) is strictly negative. This implies that, for < 0, su¢ ciently close to zero, the triple x( j ; c ; y); y( j ; y); z ( ) satis…es the endpoint constraint (5.8), as well as (5.7) and (2.3) -(2.6). Because (x ( ); y ( ); z ( )) = (x( j0; 0; y); y( j0; y); z ( )) maximizes (2.2) under these constraints, it follows that Z 1 0 f (x(tj0; 0; y); y(tj0; y); z (t); t)dt
f (x(tj ; c ; y); y(tj ; y); z (t); t)dt: (5.33) for all negative that are close to zero. By the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 4.6, this yields the …rst-order condition
and, from this …rst-order condition, the inequality 
(5.36) Therefore, one computes
By (5.10), the …rst term on the right-hand side is equal to zero. If one integrates the second term by parts, using the fact that, by Lemma 5.3, one has '(1) = 0, one obtains
as in the proof of Lemma 4.6. By the same calculation as before, one then obtains By the same argument as in the proof of Corollary 4.7, it follows that, for almost every t and i = 1; :::; m; i (t) = 0 if y i ( ) is increasing at t; and, therefore, that R 1 0 (t) dy s (t) = 0: Given that, by the analogue of Lemma 4.4, (t) q (t) = 0 for all t; the lemma follows immediately.
To conclude the paper, I brie ‡y discuss the role of the Regularity Condition. This condition is used to establish that = 1 and to establish the inequality (5.38). In the proof that = 1; the Regularity Condition could be replaced by any other condition ensuring that, in a neighbourhood of the optimal (x ( ); y ( ); z ( )); the constraint is not degenerate. To establish (5.38), however, something more speci…c is needed.
In this latter context, two aspects of the Regularity Condition matter. First, if the variation y( j ; y) of y ( ) that is considered in the proof of Lemma 4.6 induces a violation of the endpoint condition for t = 1; it must be possible to …nd a countervailing variation in some other variable. Here, this variable is the component (0) of the initial state x(0). Second, at the level of …rst-order conditions, the countervailing variation in the other variable does not a¤ect the evaluation of the overall variation because, at the optimum, one is indi¤erent to small changes in this variable. Under the Regularity Condition, a small change in (0) is a matter of indi¤erence because this component of the initial state x(0) is not subject to any endpoint condition, and the associated costate variable ' (0) is zero.
One easily veri…es that the conclusions of Theorem 5.1 remain valid whenever these two conditions hold for some variable of the optimization. Suppose, for example, that a uniform increase y 0 in the level of y(t) for all t can be used to raise G 1 (x(1)) and, thereby, to counteract any e¤ects that the replacement of y ( ) by y( j ; y) might have on the endpoint constraint. Suppose also that the nonnegativity constraint on y( ) is nowhere binding, i.e., that the function M ( ) in the preceding analysis is identically equal to zero. Then a minor variation of the argument given here shows that the conclusions of Theorem 5.1 are still valid.
However, the last part of the argument breaks down if the nonnegativity constraints on y( ) are binding somewhere, so that a small uniform increase in the level of y(t) for all t is not a matter of indi¤erence. In this case, the argument yields the inequality
whereĉ is a constant indicating the relation between the multiple of y by which y(t) is raised for all t and the amount by which the parameter lies below zero. By contrast to (5.38), this condition is not suitable for signing the left-hand side. The same arguments apply if a suitable change in the other control variables, i.e., the function z( ); can be used to counteract the e¤ects of the replacement of y ( ) by y( j ; y) on the endpoint constraint. If the optimal z ( ) is characterized by …rst-order conditions holding as equations, the conclusions of Theorem 5.1 are still valid. If the optimal z ( ) is characterized by …rst-order conditions holding as strict inequalities, one ends up with a condition like (5.39), which does not permit any further inference. The question then is whether this invalidates the conclusions of the theorem or whether these conclusions could still be obtained by some other argument. For now, unfortunately, I have to leave this question open.
A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4.1. As mentioned in the text, the argument is by and large the same as in the standard treatment of existence, uniqueness and continuity properties of solutions to a system of ordinary di¤eren-tial equations. Recalling the fact that the functions h(:; :; :; ), 2 [0; 1]; are equi-Lipschitzian, let K be the common Lipschitz constant. For r = 0; 1; :::; 4K 2; let t r = r 4K ; and consider the integral equation
on the interval [t r ; t r + 1 2K ]: I claim that, for given x(t r ); y( ); and z( ); this equation has a unique solution x( jt r ; x(t r ); y( ); z( )):
To establish this claim, let C`([t r ; t r + 28 one has T r;xr;y( );z( ) x( )(t) T r;xr;y( );z( ) x( )(t)
This shows that the mapping T r;xr;y( );z( ) is a contraction mapping with modulus 
i.e., the di¤erent …xed points coincide on the intersections over their domains. To establish this claim, I …rst note that, with a slight abuse of notation, T r+1;x r+1 ;y( );z( ) can also be treated as a mapping from C`([t r+1 ; t r + x r (tjx r ; y( ); z( )) = T r;xr;y( );z( ) x r ( jx r ; y( ); z( ))(t)
h(x r ( jx r ; y( ); z( )); y( ); z( ); )d
h(x r ( jx r ; y( ); z( )); y( ); z( ); )d = T r+1;x r+1 ;y( );z( ) x r ( jx r ; y( ); z( ))(t) so that the restriction of x r ( jx r ; y( ); z( )) to the interval [t r+1 ; t r + 1 2K ] is in fact a …xed point of the mapping T r+1;x r+1 ;y( );z( ) when treated as a mapping from C`([t r+1 ; t r + 1 2K ]) into itself. Because the …xed point of T r+1;x r+1 ;y( );z( ) is unique, it follows that the restrictions of x r ( jx r ; y( ); z( )) and of x r+1 ( jx r+1 ; y( ); z( )) to the interval [t r+1 ; t r + 1 2K ] are equal. Now let x(0) be given, and de…ne x( ) so that, for any r; ] must coincide with the restriction of x( ) to this interval: By a straightworward induction argument, it follows that x(t r ) = x(t r ) for all r; and that the restriction of x( ) to any one of the intervals [t r ; t r + 1 2K ] must coincide with the restriction of x( ) to this interval. Therefore, x( ) = x( ):
Proof. I will compare the functions x( ) = x( jx(0); y( ); z( )) and x ( ) = x( jx(0) + x; y( ) + y; z( ) + z): As in the proof of Lemma 4.1, de…ne t r = r 4K for r = 0; 1; :::; 4K 2; and note that, for t 2 [t r ; t r + 1 2K ]; (A.5) implies x(t) = x r (tjx(t r ); y( ); z( )) and x (t) = x r (tjx (t r ); y( ) + y; z( ) + z); where x r ( jx(t r ); y( ); z( )) and x r ( jx (t r ); y( )+ y; z( )+ z) are the …xed points of the contraction mappings T r;x(tr);y( );z( ) and T r;x (tr);y( )+ y;z( )+ z on C`([t r ; t r + where I have written T 0 r;x (tr);y( )+ y;z( )+ z x( )(t) instead of x(t). Because T r;x (tr);y( )+ y;z( )+ z is a contraction mapping of modulus Because x r ( jx (t r ); y( ) + y; z( ) + z) is a …xed point of the mapping T r; x(tr); y( ); z( ) ; this inequality in turn implies that kx (t) x(t)k 2 T r;x (tr);y( )+ y;z( )+ z x( )(t) T r;x(tr);y( );z( ) x( )(t) (A.6) for all t 2 [t r ; t r + Upon combining this inequality with (A.6), one infers that, for all r and all t 2 [t r ; t r + 1 2K ]; one has kx (t) x(t)k 2 (kx (t r ) x(t r )k + K(k yk + k zk)) : (A.9)
Because, for any r; one has t r+1 = r+1 4K = t r + 1 4K ; it follows, in particular, that kx (t r+1 ) x(t r+1 )k 2 (kx (t r ) x(t r )k + K(k yk + k zk)) and, hence, kx (t r+1 ) x(t r+1 )k 2 r+1 k xk + (2 
